Regulated Retail Tariff Structures, Dial-Up Substitution and Broadband Diffusion: Learning from New Zealand's Experience by Howell, Bronwyn
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulated Retail Tariff Structures, Dial-Up 
Substitution and Broadband Diffusion: 
Learning from New Zealand’s Experience 
 
March 2008 
 
 
Bronwyn Howell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc. and  
Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, 
Wellington, New Zealand.    Email bronwyn.howell@vuw.ac.nz
 
Submitted to the European Association of Researchers in Industrial Economics (EARIE) 
conference, September 4-6, 2008, Toulouse, France 
 
Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of John de 
Ridder, Lewis Evans and Heikki Hammainen during the preparation of this paper, and the 
support colleagues at the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, 
Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington and the Networking 
Laboratory of the Helsinki University of Technology, whilst undertaking the research project 
“20 Years of Telecommunications Regulation in New Zealand”.  Financial support in 
Helsinki was provided by the Deane Endowment Trust. The views in this paper solely reflect 
those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which she is 
affiliated or their constituent members. Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of 
the author.   
Abstract 
Despite an apparent absence of supply side impediments to the uptake of broadband, New 
Zealand has persistently exhibited one of the lowest numbers of connections per capita in the 
OECD.  Whilst geographic, demographic and economic factors may partially explain the 
disparity, they fail to explain the comparatively low uptake in a country that, in the early 
2000s, ranked amongst the top OECD countries in the number of internet users per capita and 
average usage per account.    Demand side factors, however, offer some insights.  Using a 
combination of diffusion theory, two-part tariffs, price discrimination and bundling, this paper 
proposes that the historic flat-rate tariff for local voice telephony has resulted in substitution 
from legacy dial-up to frontier broadband internet access in New Zealand occurring at a 
higher user valuation of both internet connection and usage than if the telephony tariff was set 
at a level whereby the fixed component recovered fixed costs and the variable usage 
component was set at marginal cost – the tariff structure that prevails in most other OECD 
countries. 
 
The New Zealand experience suggests that the extensive use of flat-rate tariffs for the current 
generation of broadband technologies (e.g. ADSL) may impose similar braking of the rate and 
timing of substitution to future internet access technologies (e.g. fibre to the home).   These 
effects are exacerbated if the legacy connection is purchased as part of a bundle where 
customers predominantly value other elements more highly than the internet component.  
Substitution inertia created by the flat-rate tariff may only be overcome by the development 
of new applications which are both highly-valued by the majority of users and which can only 
be feasibly deployed using the frontier technology.  
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New Zealand’s low level of per-capita broadband uptake relative to other OECD countries 
has been widely perceived as a significant problem, leading to substantial regulatory reform 
of the telecommunications sector in 2006 with the specific objective of increasing uptake, and 
projecting new Zealand into the top quartile of the OECD in broadband connections per 
capita (MED, 2006).  Despite considerable international debate, and few firm conclusions 
about the relative importance of each of the factors which appear to be correlated to 
broadband uptake (e.g. Hausman & Sidak; Wallsten, 2005; Wallsten & Sacher, 2005; Ford, 
Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007; Crandall & Sidak, 2007), the New Zealand regulatory actions were 
prompted by an analysis (Network Strategies, 2006) that found the competitive environment 
the most plausible explanation for New Zealand’s low ranking.  The finding was deemed 
sufficient to justify wide-ranging regulatory reform, including full local loop and sub-loop 
unbundling and structural separation, principally because it was the only factor of those 
examined where New Zealand was found to be at the extreme when compared to the top eight 
countries in broadband connections per capita (Howell, 2006).   
 
The New Zealand analysis is conspicuous for its near-complete focus upon supply-side 
factors in its attempt to attribute causation for New Zealand’s perceived poor performance, 
thereby limiting the search for policies to remedy the perceived problem to supply-side 
interventions.  Melody (2005) notes that such a focus is not uncommon, as the body of 
regulatory knowledge has developed as a consequence of regulating firms in mature markets 
of already widely-diffused technologies, where the principal objective was to constrain 
market power.  In such markets, the presence of residual pent-up demand is typically taken 
for granted (Howell, 2008).  Consequently, little attention has been given in the regulatory 
arena to developing models to assist in understanding how demand-side factors influence the 
already-regulated markets, let alone to understanding how demand and supply interact in 
emerging markets where new technologies are only in the early stages of their diffusion.   
 
Limitations in the body of regulatory knowledge, therefore, may plausibly account for the 
lack of consideration given in the 2006 New Zealand analyses  to a significant, regulatorily-
imposed, demand-side difference between New Zealand and all other countries in the top 
quartile in the OECD broadband connections per capita rankings except Canada – the historic 
sale of residential telephone services at flat-rate tariffs.  In part to address this lack of 
understanding, and to further explore the role of retail tariff structures in the diffusion of 
technologies, this paper explores both theory and the New Zealand case data to determine if 
this line of inquiry better explains the New Zealand broadband uptake pattern than the supply-
side conclusions of the 2006 study. 
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Section 1 summarises the existing literature on the key drivers of broadband uptake.  Section 
2 then examines the New Zealand data, and narrows down the inquiry to tariff structure 
differences by eliminating all other possible explanations for the difference.  The principal 
enigma emerging is that New Zealand’s low uptake is especially puzzling given the 
apparently high levels of dial-up internet use evidenced.  This leads to the implication that the 
New Zealand ‘problem’ is principally one of why the substitution from dial-up to broadband 
has not occurred as rapidly as elsewhere.  Section 3 begins by constructing a model based 
upon diffusion theory to surface the ways in which different tariff structures will influence the 
point of substitution.  The model is extended to take account of how different tariff structures 
and bundling effects result in different points of purchase and substitution for users with 
different valuations of the goods in the bundle, over the dimensions of both connection and 
usage of the network.  The effects of flat-rate tariffs in particular are shown to bias upward 
the marginal valuations of both connection to and usage of the internet at which the 
substitution will occur.  As use of the internet is a derived demand, the valuation of 
applications is paramount.  Application to the New Zealand case data leads to the conclusion 
that the dial-up tariff structure offers the most cogent explanation for the New Zealand data.  
Section 4 concludes by extrapolating the lessons for other jurisdictions given the extensive 
use of flat-rate tariffs and bundling in the sale of broadband accounts.     
 
1. What Drives Broadband Uptake? 
The extent to which broadband technologies have penetrated different OECD member 
economies has generated much research over the past decade (see de Ridder (2007), Distasio, 
Lupi & Manenti (2006), Howell (2006; 2007) and Wallsten (2006) for recent reviews).   The 
factors which determine both the number of broadband connections purchased and the rate at 
which purchase occurs are many and complex, and will invariably result in different 
outcomes in different countries.  The diffusion of any technology will take place over an 
extended period of time, most likely following the typical S-curve pattern.  At any point in 
time, due to different underlying economic, demographic, policy and other factors influencing 
when customers will purchase the technology, different countries will be at different points on 
the diffusion curve, and each national curve will have a different set of slopes.     
 
Nonetheless, due to the perceived importance of broadband as an economic enabling 
technology, much attention has been paid to determining those characteristics which appear 
most significant in explaining cross-country differences, in order to enable countries seeking 
to accelerate their diffusion rates to alter, where feasible, any underlying factors that may 
have been impeding the rate of diffusion.  Not surprisingly, much of the research effort has 
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focused upon the OECD countries where broadband diffusion has occurred first and, 
apparently, fastest (for a commentary, see Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak (2007)). 
 
To date, many factors on both the supply and demand sides of the broadband market have 
been posited as possible explanators of observed inter-country broadband penetration 
differences.  These include income (individual and country), price, the addressable market 
size, education, population density, degree of urbanisation, population age, government 
policy, the extent and form (inter-platform or intra-platform) of competition present, the 
length of time and the extent to which the technology is available, and even weather1.   Whilst 
statistically significant univariate correlations have been found between broadband 
penetration per capita and most of these factors in the many studies undertaken, in 
multivariate regressions the factors appearing most consistently as statistically significant are 
the size of the addressable market, income, price, and some combination of population 
density and urbanisation (de Ridder, 2006 Table 1).  The findings in respect of competition 
and regulatory factors are more equivocal, with model specification being apparently a 
significant factor (e.g. in de Ridder’s analysis of eight multivariate studies, in all but one case 
competition and local loop unbundling are either both statistically significant or neither is 
significant as a driver of broadband penetration).   
 
2. The New Zealand Enigma 
In light of these findings, New Zealand remains a persistent enigma in respect of its 
obdurately low broadband penetration per capita (16.5 in June 20072 compared to leader 
Denmark at 34.3, and 20th out of 30 OECD countries, having ranked as low as 23rd in 2005 
and with a high of 17th in 2001).  Whilst the country’s GDP per capita ranks lowly (21st in the 
OECD 20033), and population density is low by OECD standards (Network Strategies, 2006), 
New Zealand appears to exhibit few other barriers that appear to explain its absolute and 
relatively low uptake per capita.   
 
2.1 Supply-Side 
On the supply side, ethernet LAN broadband has been available commercially since 1996, 
and since 1999, up to five technologies (cable, ADSL satellite, wireless and mobile) have 
competed for customers in various localities (although cable is not widespread).  Fast- 
                                                     
1 These are in addition to the factors such as age, gender, household and individual income, highest level of education achieved 
and occupation which have been found to have some power in explaining diffusion patterns between households within a country 
(e.g. OECD, 2007; Rappoport, Kridel & Taylor, 2002; 2003) 
2 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/35/39574709.xls 
3 http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/nz-in-the-oecd/gdp-per-capita.htm 
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download ADSL was made available widely and early - 2Mbps ADSL has been the standard 
offering from the incumbent since January 1999 until speeds were upgraded in 2005 (NZ was 
third in the OECD to offer ADSL commercially – 128kbps and 256kbps services were 
introduced subsequently), the technology was widely available (85% of customers able to 
access it by 2003, by 2007 the reach was 95% - Howell, 2008) and adjusted for speed, prices 
have been comparatively low (3rd-lowest per kb/s in 2001 – OECD, 2001; and consistently in 
the lower half of the OECD between 2001 and 2007)4.   
 
Even in October 2007, New Zealand’s supply-side position still compared very favourably 
with other OECD countries featuring very much higher in the numbers of broadband 
connections per capita.  Low-end monthly subscription prices5 and prices per megabit/second6 
were both 7th lowest in the OECD, and the country mid-ranked in the average monthly 
subscription prices per megabit/second7, with a price (in US dollars PPP) very similar to that 
of the Netherlands, which at the time had the OECD’s second-highest penetration per capita.  
Despite the presence of data caps in all packages8, the average price per megabit/second after 
reaching the bit cap was one of the lowest recorded, at only one sixth of the OECD average 
price9.  Neither does the speed of service available nationwide seem to be a particular supply-
side impediment.  In October 2007, New Zealand had the fifth-fasted advertised download 
speeds in the OECD10, and the 8th-fastest speeds advertised by an incumbent operator11. 
 
2.2 Demand-Side 
On the demand side, furthermore, New Zealand has one of the largest internet-using 
populations in the OECD (Howell, 2006).  The adoption of dial-up internet occurred early, 
and the number of hours per user account per month was amongst the highest in the OECD in 
2000 – attributed by the OECD to widespread flat-rate (unmetered) dial up telephony usage 
(OECD, 2000).  At the peak in 2003, the country’s more than 850,000 dial-up internet users 
were connected for more than 35 hours each per month (Figure 1), with internet traffic 
accounting for two thirds of local PSTN traffic (Figure 2) on a network where ‘free’ local 
calling means call minutes per account are two to three times higher than in OECD countries 
with metered calling (NZIER, 2005).   These data suggest that New Zealand’s dial-up internet 
                                                     
4 For details of these statistics over time, see Howell (2007), Howell and Marriott (2004), Howell (2003), Howell and Obren 
(2003) and Boles de Boer, Evans and Howell (2000).   
5 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/42/39574970.xls  
6 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/43/39574979.xls  
7 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/45/39575011.xls  
8 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/38/39575261.xls  
9 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/39575048.xls  
10 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/53/39575086.xls  
11 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/55/39575114.xls  
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users were amongst the most prolific in the OECD as a consequence of cheap dial-up access, 
but have been slow to substitute to broadband, despite having access to some of the OECD’s 
fastest, cheapest and most widely available ADSL services.   
 
Whilst it might be that New Zealanders lack the technological sophistication to take 
advantage of broadband technologies, this contention is not supported by either educational 
achievement indicators or history.  New Zealanders have historically been very early and avid 
adopters of new technologies of all kinds, and electronic technologies in particular.  Uptake 
and use of electronic funds transfer and electronic banking were world-leading in 2000 (Boles 
de Boer, Evans and Howell, 2000), and in 2005, the consumer-to-consumer trading platform 
TradeMe became the most-visited website in the country, exceeding the traditional web 
portals such as MSN and Yahoo (Howell, 2006) – a position it still maintains in 2008.  
Furthermore, cellphone diffusion is also very high.  In 2005, New Zealand at 101.9 
connections per 100 population ranked 10th in the OECD, only slightly behind Finland at 
102.712.  Moreover, at this time, over 20% of subscribers were connected to 3G networks – 
the 3rd-highest diffusion of this technology in the OECD after Korea and Japan, and 
substantially ahead of the nearest European rivals Austria and Italy (around 10% of 
subscribers) (OECD, 2007:99).   
 
2.3 Regulatory Environment 
The absence of mandatory local loop unbundling and low levels of competition have been 
offered as possible reasons for New Zealand’s low broadband uptake (MED, 2006; Network 
Strategies, 2006).  However, it is not at all clear that these are plausible explanations, given 
the equivocal support found for them as statistically significant factors in the multivariate 
regressions.  Using Wallsten’s (2006) multivariate equations, the presence of co-mingling c-
location unbundling in New Zealand would have led to only a very small and not consistently 
statistically significant increase in the number of broadband connections per capita (between 
2.8 and 4 connections per 100 population, depending upon the presence or absence of other 
regulatory instruments), and been insufficient to push it any further than one place up the 
OECD broadband per capita rankings as at the end of 2005.   Indeed, New Zealand’s actual 
broadband uptake per capita in 2005 was less than 2 per 100 lower than predicted by some of 
Wallsten’s equations.    
 
                                                     
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/011460012458  
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Furthermore, if the objective of access regulation is to induce competition which will put 
downward pressure on retail prices and thereby increase uptake, it is not clear that increased 
competition via access regulation will necessarily have any significant effect upon New 
Zealand uptake levels, given the already comparatively low retail prices.  Since 2004, 
regulated bitstream access has been available to entrants at internationally benchmarked 
TSLRIC-based prices which it is claimed by entrants are too high to enable a viable entrant 
business case, given the incumbent’s already-low retail prices.  Regulated benchmarked 
TSLRIC prices of $NZ27.87 per month prevailed when the incumbent’s entry level product 
had been priced at $NZ29.95 per month even prior to bitstream access being mandated, 
compared to previously-available regulated wholesale packages sold to entrants at retail, 
minus discounts in the order of 14% to 18% (Howell, 2007).  Consequently, Figure 3 shows 
that, relative to the period when wholesale access prevailed, competition (measured as the 
market share of entrants) has decreased since bitstream access was made available in 2004, 
despite New Zealand exhibiting the OECD’s fourth-fastest growth rate in connections per 
capita over the period 2005-6 – a scenario that is quite consistent with an absence of a supply-
side pricing ‘problem’ in the form of monopoly pricing arising from exertion of dominance, 
and therefore one where access regulation would have negligible effect upon uptake via the 
pricing mechanism13.     
 
2.4 The Enigma Prevails 
Rather, Wallsten’s equations suggest that it is New Zealand’s low GDP per capita, low 
population density and lower-than-average number of telephone lines per capita (possibly due 
to large average household size - see Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak (2007) for a discussion of 
this issue) that are primarily responsible for low broadband uptake.  Given the size of the 
coefficients for these factors, and the limited ability to address any of these factors with 
policy instruments in the short-term, New Zealand’s low broadband uptake per capita may not 
be a ‘problem’ at all, but simply an artefact reflecting underlying demographic, geographic 
and economic characteristics.  However, this does not answer the question of why, despite an 
                                                     
13 This does not discount the possibility of market power leading to the incumbent pricing below cost to strategically foreclose 
competitive entry.  However, increased access regulation is impotent to address this eventuality (de Bijl, 2005).  Whilst it is 
acknowledged that competition in downstream product quality variation on the back of bitstream access might have some effect 
upon the benefits derived by users and hence influence the uptake rate, if the core benefit from ADSL relative to broadband is 
simply the speed of the underlying network product, it is difficult to see that choice in downstream elements would have anything 
other than a marginal effect on the purchase decision.  If the core product on its own as offered by the incumbent at low prices 
does not appeal sufficiently to dial-up users to induce broadband purchase, it seems implausible that a potential customer will 
eschew the incumbent’s broadband offerings, even though broadband purchase per se might be beneficial, simply to wait to take 
advantage of an entrant’s alternative marketing, billing system, email management services etc.  The one area where downstream 
services may make a difference would be content bundling.  However, to date, there have been no substantial content offerings 
bundled with either the incumbent’s or entrants’ offerings in New Zealand simply because the most popular pay-to-view content 
– SkyTV – is owned by a company with its own proprietary satellite-based broadcast infrastructure, and therefore has no need to 
partner with an infrastructure provider to reach its customers. However, it is noted that SkyTV is now offering premium pay-per-
view content on 3G mobile phones, in conjunction with Vodafone. But given the different distribution channels that mobile 
telephony offers, this would be seen as complementary to, rather than competing with, SkyTV’s existing offers. 
3/17/2008 -8- 8
absence of supply-side impediments and a highly sophisticated demand side already internet-
experienced and inured to high levels of dial-up internet use, substitution to broadband by 
these experienced users has been so slow.   
 
3. An Alternative Line of Inquiry 
An area of potential inquiry which has so far not been well-explored in the literature, but 
which offers some insight into this question is the effect of retail tariff structures on the 
method of internet connection purchased, and especially their effect in determining the point 
at which an existing dial-up internet user will substitute to broadband access.  The role of flat 
rate tariffs is well-documented as an inducement to use a technology once a connection has 
been purchased (Anania and Solomon, 1997; Odlyzko, 2004; 2001), but the literature is less 
clear on how such tariffs affect the decision to purchase a connection in the first place.  
Neither is the literature explicit about the effect of mixtures of tariff structures upon the 
decision to substitute from one connection type to another.  The enigmatic New Zealand data 
may possibly be explained by the application of a combination of the theories relating to tariff 
structures (two-part tariffs, price discrimination) for a bundle of connection and usage of a 
service (internet access) and diffusion, whereby the service which undergoes a technological 
improvement resulting in the substitution over time of the legacy technology (dial-up) to a 
frontier technology (broadband).   
 
3.1 The Diffusion of Legacy and Frontier Technologies 
The technology diffusion literature suggests that for a General Purpose Technology (GPT) 
such as the internet (Helpman & Trajtenberg, 1996; Greenwood & Yorukoglu, 1997; 
Greenwood, Seshadri & Yoruloglu, 2000), where demand for the technology is derived from 
the value accrued by the use of a number of applications (Crawford, 1999), a user of the 
legacy technology will purchase the frontier only when the additional benefits from the 
applications used, less the switching and adjustment costs, exceed the additional costs of 
purchasing the frontier (Jovanovic & Stolyarov, 2000).  Under diffusion theory, if the frontier 
technology diffuses rapidly and displaces the legacy from the market, then it is said to be 
unconditionally dominant.  This occurs when the frontier is so much cheaper or delivers so 
many greater benefits to users given their existing application base that all new and potential 
users purchase it very soon after it becomes available, even though the legacy still exists. 
Initial diffusion of the frontier is rapid, due to extensive substitution by existing users (i.e. the 
S-curve is very steep initially).   
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However, if the additional benefits from purchasing the frontier are not large, or the costs of 
switching and adjustment are extensive, large numbers of existing users will persist with the 
legacy technology, delaying the point at which substitution will occur until the net benefits 
are positive, and slowing down the diffusion of the frontier relative to the case of it being 
dominant (i.e. the S-curve is flatter).  New users who have not purchased the legacy 
technology do not face switching and adjustment costs, so will purchase the frontier 
technology as long as its benefits minus costs are positive and exceed those accrued when 
purchasing the legacy.  If the legacy technology yields greater net benefits to a user, then 
despite the presence of the frontier technology in the market, the legacy will be purchased.  If 
benefits conferred by the frontier technology are not large (or costs are large), or they are not 
highly valued by users (i.e. demand is elastic), then diffusion of the frontier will take longer to 
occur than if the benefits are larger (costs are smaller) and benefits are highly valued (less 
elastic demand).   
 
3.1.1 A Simple Substitution Model 
Howell (2008) develops a simple model to explain the substitution.  Assuming that the 
principal benefit of broadband over dial-up pertains to time savings and the ability to use 
applications which are technologically infeasible on dial-up, diffusion theory thus suggests 
that substitution to broadband by an individual user i with valuation of time iγ  per minute 
will occur at the time t where the cost of acquiring the benefits  from using a set of 
applications j = 1,2, …, n each requiring 
ij
n
j β1=Σ
jυ  megabytes of bandwidth and  minutes of time 
using broadband sold at fixed price and variable price per megabyte exceeds the cost 
of acquiring those same benefits using dial-up at fixed cost  , variable price  per minute 
and takes  minutes to accrue
BjT
BF BF
DF DV
DjT 14.   That is:  
( ) 0)()( 11 >−Σ+−Σ+− == jBDjDnjBjDjnjiBD VTVTTFF υγ .   (1) 
 
Equation (1) shows that substitution to broadband will be more likely to occur if the fixed 
costs for dial-up are large relative to the fixed cost of broadband, the value of time for the user 
is high (and/or broadband is significantly faster than dial-up – connection speed is implicitly 
captured in the user value of time), or the volume of information transfers (determined by 
application volume and bandwidth demands) is large.  It is less likely to occur if the per-
                                                     
14 Whilst there may be some switching costs for the user in purchasing a broadband modem and scrapping the existing dial-up 
one, these costs are assumed to be trivial, and subsumed into the fixed costs.  Learning effects are also ignored. 
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megabyte charge is large relative to the per-minute charge, the value of user time is low, or 
the relative speed difference is small.  
 
3.1.2 Application to New Zealand 
Figures 1, 4 and 5 interpreted together with equation 1 indicate that New Zealand’s broadband 
uptake ‘problem’ is not necessarily one of extent, but one of timing.  Figure 3 shows that, 
until mid 2003, dial-up internet connection and broadband connection numbers were 
positively correlated, even though the average number of hours connected per dial-up account 
was also increasing (i.e. existing dial-up users were increasing their dial-up usage, either by 
using more applications, or more extensively using existing applications rather than switching 
to broadband, and new internet users were continuing to buy dial-up connections).  Despite its 
low prices, broadband was certainly not a dominant technology.  However, in 2003, when 
average dial-up usage peaked at around 35 hours per account, a ‘tipping point’ was reached, 
and substitution to broadband accelerated.  Figure 5 indicates that, consistent with equation 
(1), it is the predominantly the highest-using dial-up users that are substituting to broadband, 
leaving low users on the dial-up network, albeit with the rate of substitution accelerating post 
2003.   
 
Given the high average volume of usage at which the tipping point occurred relative to other 
countries that experienced earlier switching to broadband at much lower dial-up usage levels 
(OECD, 2007a), and the fact New Zealand’s growth in broadband subscribers in 2005-6 was 
fourth-highest in the OECD, it appears that New Zealand’s S-shaped broadband diffusion 
pattern has simply occurred later than in most other OECD countries (technically, the value of 
t, taken as the time since the invention of broadband at which an individual substitutes, is 
higher for the average New Zealander than the average user in many other OECD countries).  
Put another way, the already mature and highly-used dial-up internet markets in New Zealand 
continued to develop for much longer than they did in other OECD countries, with users 
persisting with dial-up connections for much higher volumes of usage, delaying the point at 
which substitution to DSL began to occur relative to these other countries.   
 
From equation (1), this could have occurred because the average valuation of user time is 
very much lower in New Zealand than in other countries.  Whilst this is plausible, individuals 
generally appear to value their internet use time lowly in other countries as well.  Varian’s 
(2002) Californian INDEX study found very low valuations, and surveys in both the United 
States and the European Union find that broadband users do not appear to be prepared to pay 
very much to receive faster broadband connections (Horrigan, 2006; EU, 2006).  As the 
application range used by New Zealanders is unlikely to be significantly different from that of 
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users in other countries, the only remaining explanation using equation (1) appears to be the 
relative prices of dial-up and broadband access and use.  Whilst broadband is not expensive in 
New Zealand compared to other OECD countries, dial-up is extremely cheap.   
 
3.2 The Role of Tariff Levels and Forms 
De Ridder (2007) finds the relative price of broadband is a significant factor in determining 
broadband uptake levels in his regressions, and comments that of all the OECD countries in 
2005, only five (Czech Republic, Mexico, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey) had higher 
relative values of broadband to dial-up prices than New Zealand.  Indeed, his equations 
suggest that New Zealand’s broadband uptake per 100 would be between 2 and 4 higher if 
New Zealand exhibited the OECD average relative prices – that is, relative price appears to be 
at least as important in De Ridder’s equations as exchange co-location is in Wallsten’s as an 
explanation for New Zealand’s lower-than-expected uptake.   Cheap dial-up is thus most 
likely implicated in the delay in New Zealand’s rate of substitution to broadband.  However, 
as the OECD identified in 2000, the extent of the benefits conferred from dial-up arise 
principally because both dial-up telephony and ISP charges are sold on a flat-rate (unmetered) 
basis.  This leads to a tentative hypothesis that the New Zealand dial-up tariff structure is a 
factor in delaying New Zealand broadband uptake.   
 
3.2.1 Historical Tariff Structures in New Zealand 
Unmetered local PSTN calling has been a feature of the New Zealand telephony market since 
1879, when the incumbent Superintendent of Telegraphs determined that it was too costly for 
government-employed telephonists at the new government-owned exchanges15 to record the 
details of calls connected within a local exchange.  Consequently residential telephony 
consumers have never paid any usage-based fees for local calls on the PSTN16.  As exchanges 
merged and increased in size, ‘free’ local calling areas became subject to political, rather than 
technological determination (Howell, 2007, drawing upon Wilson, 1994).  When Telecom 
New Zealand was privatised in 1990, a contractual deed in the company’s constitution 
(known initially as the ‘Kiwi Share’ and subsequently the Telecommunications Service Order 
(TSO)) bound the company to always offer an unmetered local calling tariff17.  Despite 
metered tariffs being offered in the late 1990s in response to competitive entry, very few 
customers took advantage of them, and they are no longer offered.  Indeed, the size of the 
                                                     
15 It was illegal for anyone other than the New Zealand Government to operate a telephone system without the permission of the 
Governor in Council (essentially political sanction) from the inception of the first service in 1879 until the passing of the 
Telecommunications Act in 1987 (Wilson, 1994).  
16 Per call charges for business users were introduced only following the privatization of Telecom in 1990.   
17 This obligation was part of the bundle of ‘light-handed’ regulatory provisions that governed the New Zealand 
telecommunications market in the period 1997-2001 (Howell, 2007).   
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‘free’ local calling area has become a feature upon which competing providers now 
differentiate themselves in order to induce switching from Telecom18. 
 
The emergence of the internet made ‘free’ local calling extremely valuable to individuals who 
used internet applications.   Furthermore, the nature of the prevailing interconnect contract at 
the time internet connection numbers surged provided substantial arbitrage opportunities that 
resulted in ISPs subscribing to non-Telecom networks receiving a share of interconnect 
revenues as a consequence of the large volume of call minutes originating on the Telecom 
network.  As Telecom was bound under the ‘Kiwi Share’ contractual obligations to offer 
unmetered local calling, it could not withdraw the now extremely attractive ‘free’ local 
calling tariff.  Competing network owners, in order to ensure they recruited a 
disproportionately large share of Telecom telephony customers generating even larger 
interconnect revenue flows from Telecom as a consequence of the volume of internet-related 
interconnect minutes, vigorously recruited ISPs as their customers, usually by sharing the 
interconnect revenues.  In turn, to attract customers, non-Telecom ISPs shared the 
interconnect revenues (Karel, 2003). Telecom responded by aggressively marketing ‘flat-rate’ 
ISP charges to maintain customers.  Consequently, a highly-competitive ISP market emerged, 
with very low-priced and even free connections, and ‘flat-rate’ ISP charges were common.  
Together, the free telephony usage and low ISP costs resulted in New Zealand exhibiting very 
much higher levels of dial-up internet usage (OECD, 2000; Howell, 2003), lower average ISP 
fees (Boles de Boer, Evans and Howell, 2000) and higher levels of internet connections per 
capita than other comparator countries despite having fewer ISPs per capita (Boles de Boer, 
Enright & Evans, 2000).    
 
3.2.2 Tariff Structures and Broadband Infrastructure Development 
As one of a number of strategic responses19 to stop the flow of interconnect revenues to 
competitors, Telecom moved quickly to roll out widespread, very fast, very low-priced ADSL 
in an endeavour to bring forward the substitution of dial-up customers from regulated PTSN 
services to (then) unregulated broadband.  To make the product appealing to low-volume as 
well as high-volume users and again to accelerate substitution, Telecom offered the product 
via a menu of multiple two-part tariffs20.   It cannot be discounted that the company also 
                                                     
18 TelstraClear’s ‘Big Back Yard’ offers seven extensive ‘free calling; areas, crossing boundaries where Telecom still imposes 
long distance charges.  http://www.telstraclear.co.nz  
19 For an analysis of the other strategic responses, see Howell (2007).  
20 Another reason for this pricing pertains to the extensive volume of data (in excess of 90% of internet traffic) sourced from 
offshore, and carried by the monopoly trans-oceanic Southern Cross cable.  The small populations of New Zealand and Australia, 
which is also served by this cable, the very long length of this cable (it traverses from Australia  to New Zealand and thence on to 
Hawaii and the Pacific seabord of the United States, at which point its owners exchange traffic with United States carriers) and 
the nature of internet peer-to-peer network charging conventions, mean that the entire cost of traffic traveling in both directions 
on this cable are borne by only a very small population.  Southern Cross cable costs thus impose a substantial cost burden per 
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offered entry level connections below cost (as indicated above by the very low tariffs 
compared to TSLRIC-benchmarked prices).  As even the average dial-up internet user 
subscribing to a non-Telecom ISP in 1999 was generating an interconnect liability for 
Telecom of $12 per month on a PSTN account priced at only slightly over $30 per month, 
strategically the firm could afford to discount ADSL below cost up to the average 
interconnect loss per non-Telecom ISP customer and not be any worse off than if the 
customer remained on dial-up.  However, whilst such actions might normally be considered 
predatory pricing to foreclose competition, in this instance unless such actions were taken, it 
was likely that Telecom would have faced financial ruin (Howell, 2007).   
 
However, despite its ADSL roll-out and pricing strategies, as Figures 1, 4 and 5 show, 
Telecom was unsuccessful in achieving its substitution objectives, as the attractiveness of 
cheap dial-up appears to have overwhelmed the effect of very low priced, high-speed DSL, 
even for users who were consuming in excess of one hour per day connected to the internet.  
Re-examination of equation (1) begs the now-obvious question: which of the four pricing 
factors – the fixed (connection) and variable (usage) fees paid for each of dial-up and 
broadband – has placed the biggest brake on New Zealand’s substitution from dial-up to 
broadband relative to other OECD countries?    This leads directly to a discussion of the role 
of two-part tariffs, price discrimination and bundling, and their effects upon both technology 
diffusion and the time of substitution from legacy to frontier technologies. 
 
3.3 A Two-Part Tariff Model of Substitution and Diffusion 
Whilst flat-rate tariffs might encourage usage of a technology one an individual has purchased 
a connection, how does the tariff structure affects the decision to purchase the connection in 
the first place?  As broadband diffusion is measured as the number of connections sold, it is 
apposite to examine the role of tariff structure in inducing purchases to be made in the first 
place.  As mobile telephony diffusion patterns have illustrated, widespread application of 
metered usage tariffs does not appear to have impeded purchase of connections to this 
technology, even in the New Zealand environment where unmetered fixed-line local calling 
has prevailed.  Rather, it has been common in the telephony industry to use two-part tariffs, 
precisely to increase the number of connections amongst low-using populations, by separating 
out the price of connection from the price of usage of that connection.  
                                                                                                                                                        
internet account in Australia and New Zealand.  By charging separately for traffic and connection, via so-called ‘capped’ plans, 
the costs can be shared according to the data demands of individual users.  In the initial years of broadband sale in New Zealand, 
it was routine for ISPs to charge differently for international and national traffic (e.g. unlimited local traffic, but metered 
international).  However, the very small volumes of local traffic rendered  this charging method of little value for the vast 
majority of internet users, and it has largely been abandoned.   
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 In essence, a two-part tariff for telephony or internet access comprises the ‘tied’ purchase of 
both connection and usage – both goods must be purchased together for any benefit to be 
derived from either.  Such tariffs have been common due to the historic ‘natural monopoly’ 
nature of telephony cost structures where the good will not be supplied at marginal cost, as 
over the relevant quantity range average cost never falls below marginal cost and the provider 
cannot break even in the long run.  If a fixed price for each connection to the network is 
charged to enable all fixed costs to be recovered, each unit of usage can be charged as at 
marginal cost.  Costs are fully recovered, and the service is produced (Carlton & Perloff, 
2000).  However, under a single two-part tariff, those who consume fewer call minutes or 
megabytes of bandwidth in effect pay a higher average price per call minute/megabyte when 
the two charges are added together.   Whether or not a connection is purchased in the first 
place will be determined by whether the benefits accrued from purchase of the bundle exceed 
its price, given the usage volume determined by the applications driving demand for usage.   
 
By way of illustration, a consumer with a low call valuation and low demand volume (type 1) 
will purchase neither connection nor calls because the high average price per call exceeds 
benefits accrued.  However, a consumer with the same call valuation as type 1 but a higher 
demand (type 2) may purchase the bundle, as the average price faced per call is lower, and 
may now exceed the benefit threshold.  An individual with the same demand volume as the 
type 1, but a higher (type 2) call valuation (type 3) may purchase as for this consumer the 
average price per call exceeds the benefit accrued.  Likewise, as the call volume demanded 
increases for individuals with the same valuation as the type 3, the benefit accrued per call 
increases as the average price per call decreases (type 4).   
 
3.3.1 Price Discrimination and Diffusion 
‘Tied’ pricing can also be used as a method of price discrimination when the demand for the 
two goods is inter-related, in order to increase profits without reducing welfare.  The price 
charged for the first good is set, and the second good charged at a price above cost.  Those 
valuing the second good higher (e.g. make multiple purchases of it) thus pay a higher 
effective price for the first good (Carlton and Perloff, 2000:302-319).  Tying can also be used 
as a form of ‘progressive tax’ whereby the additional revenues accrued from selling the 
second good above cost (calls) can be used to offset (subsidise) the cost of the first 
(connection).  Those consuming more call minutes under this arrangement effectively pay 
more for their connection than those consuming fewer minutes.  As connection prices can be 
reduced below cost, individuals with low call valuations not purchasing a connection under 
standard two-part tariffs (i.e. type 1 from above) will now purchase one, even though they do 
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not make many calls and do not value them very highly, as the subsidised price paid is now 
exceeded by the lower level of benefit accrued from calling.  However, as the price of calls 
has increased, type 2, 3 and 4 customers will make fewer calls.  As long as the extra welfare 
accrued from additional connections and calls by type 1 consumers (for example, network 
effects as well as individual benefits) exceeds the welfare lost from reduced call volumes by 
types 2, 3 and 4, then such a tariff increase welfare as well as increasing connection numbers. 
 
Two-part tariffs with connections subsidised by usage prices above cost have been 
commonplace throughout the OECD telephony markets, especially where there are positive 
network externalities from having more connections.   For government-owned 
telecommunications firms, such pricing has also been desirable for its ability to extend the 
perceived social benefits of widespread connection, as well as achieving distributional 
objectives by recovering a higher proportion of revenues from those consumers valuing the 
combined connection and usage bundle higher as they make more calls (i.e. less elastic 
demand) (Laffont and Tirole, 2002 chapters 3 and 6).  The two-part tariff is able to be viewed 
as a two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; 2003; 2004; Evans and Schmalansee, 2005; 
Wright, 2004) where calling can be considered the ‘money side’ and connection the ‘subsidy 
side’ (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006).  The 
widespread popularity of pre-paid mobile accounts is a result of the extreme case of such 
tariffs, where connection costs (excluding the handset) are zero, but calls are priced 
substantially above cost.  Viewed using this frame, Telecom’s two-part tariff for ADSL 
should have accelerated broadband uptake, but it does not appear to have been effective.   
 
By contrast, New Zealand’s residential fixed line tariff where connections subsidise calling 
appears perverse in respect of either the accrual of network benefits from a larger number of 
connections or wealth transfers favouring specific groups who might otherwise not be able to 
afford to pay for a connection.  Connection prices above cost are applied to subsidise calls 
priced below cost (i.e. zero).  Fewer connections will be purchased, as low-valuers of the 
bundle will abstain, reducing both connection and calling welfare.  Furthermore, the average 
price paid per call rises for all who purchase a connection, but the increase is least for those 
consuming most call minutes.  The higher revenues per call paid by low-volume callers 
subsidise the high-volume callers.  The smaller the calling price is, the greater the effect of 
the subsidy.   
 
In essence, flat-rate tariffs (zero usage cost) create an implicit wealth transfer from those 
consuming few call minutes (lowest call-valuers/money side) who face a high price per call-
minute to those consuming most call minutes (highest call-valuers/subsidy side) who face a 
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low price per call minute.  As occurs with any subsidy, consumption of call minutes increases 
beyond the competitive optimum where calling is priced at marginal cost, increasing total 
costs, requiring further increases in the fixed connection price, and thereby leading to even 
fewer individuals purchasing a connection.  Importantly, however, those who value the calls 
most receive the greatest effective subsidy, so are likely to increase their usage by a very 
much larger number of minutes than those who value them least, exacerbating both the 
increase required in the fixed price and the extent of the implicit wealth transfer, and the 
reduction in welfare from lost connections and usage from those users who, at the margin, 
now do not purchase a connection at all.       
 
3.3.2 Tariffs, User Valuation and Diffusion 
By extension, flat-rate tariffs for broadband connections will result in higher fixed prices, and 
all other things being equal, fewer connections being sold.  They are favoured by those 
valuing usage most, as their high usage is in effect subsidised by those who value it least.  
Broadband usage patterns have been shown to by highly asymmetric in New Zealand 
(Howell, 2003) and other countries (e.g. Finland – OECD, 2007a), with a very small number 
of customers consuming very large proportions of the data traffic (median usage lies 
substantially below average usage per account).  Whilst such tariffs have been claimed to 
reduce risk for consumers of receiving an unexpected bill when they are unaware of the 
volume of data transferred (e.g. Anania and Solomon, 1998), it has also been claimed that 
consumers facing multiple two-part tariffs are remarkably adept at switching tariffs if they 
find they are paying more than expected on a particular plan (Miravete, 2002, 2003).   
 
When applying two-part tariff theory to the diffusion theory model in equation (1), it now 
becomes material to think about how each of connection and usage are priced in relation to 
the different valuations of each of these factors by consumers of both telephony access and 
internet access.  It is important to consider that the ability to access the internet using dial-up 
has altered the factors that have typically been considered relevant in populating the 
parameters in the equation.  This has led to two different effects, termed for convenience the 
‘bundled connection’ effect and the ‘tied usage’ effect.   The different tariff approaches to 
pricing of both the telephony and broadband networks will affect the rate of substitution 
because of each of these factors, depending upon the different valuations placed on each of 
these products by consumers.  
 
3.3.3 The ‘Bundled Connection’ Effect 
Dial-up internet access bundles the telephony-based element of the connection to the internet 
with the connection to voice telephony services.  All of those valuing a telephony connection 
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highly enough to purchase under any tariff are ‘gifted’ an internet connection, irrespective of 
how highly they may value it (i.e. the telephony connection component of  in equation (1) 
is zero).  The consumer welfare arising from the value of internet connection to the user is 
thus ‘gifted’ via the connection bundle.  The higher an individual’s internet valuation, the 
greater the effective ‘discount’ gained from the bundle.  Moreover, the higher the price paid 
for the telephony connection, the greater the extent of the bundling ‘gift’ to the user (as a 
separate internet connection does not have to be purchased), and the higher the price that must 
be paid by an individual who does not value telephony connection highly but does value 
internet connection highly must pay to get access to the internet.  High telephony connection 
prices thus will inhibit dial-up internet diffusion, but only for those customers placing low 
values on telephony who do not receive the ‘bundling gift’.   
DF
 
The size of the ‘bundled connection’ ‘gift’ is material when considering the point at which a 
dial-up internet user will substitute to broadband.  In order to justify substitution, a dial-up 
user must receive sufficient additional benefit from the purchase of broadband to recover the 
extent of the ‘gift’.  The higher the extent of the ‘gift’, the greater the additional benefit from 
the new technology must be to justify substitution.  Thus, for a given level of broadband 
connection price, the higher is the telephony connection price, the greater the individual must 
value internet connection to justify substitution, as the effect of the bundling ‘gift’ must first 
be overcome.  In New Zealand, where due to connections subsidising usage the price paid for 
telephony connection is in effect the highest it could be, so too is the connection bundling gift 
the highest possible.  Thus, the internet connection valuation of the marginal substituter from 
dial-up to broadband will be higher in New Zealand (and other countries with no telephony 
usage charges such as Australia, Canada and the United States) than in a hypothetical country 
where the telephony tariff is set so that the fixed price recovers only fixed costs and does not 
subsidise usage.  
 
More generally, if the hypothetical tariff is presumed to lead to the ‘efficient’ rate of 
substitution away from dial-up for a population of internet users with varying valuations of 
both internet usage and connection, then any tariff whereby the connection charge is lower 
(higher) than the efficient one will result in the marginal substituter’s valuation of connection 
being higher (lower) than the efficient level.  For any given broadband tariff, countries where 
telephony tariffs resulted in connections being subsidised by usage would have seen 
substitution from dial-up to broadband happening at lower valuations of internet connection 
than efficient – that is, earlier in the diffusion process than if the efficient telephony tariff had 
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prevailed.  Likewise, in countries where telephony connection subsidised usage, substitution 
to broadband would have occurred later than is efficient.   
 
Thus, it is not surprising to find three of the four countries where unmetered tariffs prevailed 
(Australia, New Zealand and the United States) all apparently exhibiting later substitutions 
than might otherwise be expected.  That the fourth country, Canada, has not experienced 
delays of the same extent is likely accounted for by the fact that, unlike Australia and New 
Zealand, telephone tariffs were geographically de-averaged (OECD, 2003), meaning the more 
numerous urban consumers faced lower connection charges and did not face the double 
subsidisation ‘problem’ of their telephony connection charges having to subsidise both calling 
by all consumers and connections servicing higher-cost rural customers.  Bluntly, urban 
Canadian consumers received a smaller ‘bundled connection gift’ as a consequence of 
comparatively lower telephony connection charges, so substituted relatively earlier.   
 
3.3.4 The ‘Tied Usage’ Effect 
The second effect to consider is the ‘tied usage’ effect.  An individual who does not value 
telephony connection and calling but who has to purchase a telephony connection in order to 
access the internet via dial-up pays the average price per minute connected.  The value 
derived from the combination of access and usage therefore determines the number of 
minutes consumed.  However, a telephone connection purchaser faces only the marginal 
(usage) price because of the bundled connection gift.  If the two individuals each value the 
use of the internet equally, all other things being equal the gift beneficiary will consume more 
minutes of dial-up access than the non-beneficiary.  The greater the extent of the subsidy from 
connection to usage, the greater the beneficiary’s additional usage relative to the usage of the 
non-beneficiary.  Alternatively, for the same number of minutes of usage, the beneficiary will 
have a lower valuation of internet usage than the non-beneficiary.  The greater the extent of 
the subsidy from connection to usage, the greater the difference in internet valuation between 
the two different consumers of that number of minutes.  
 
It now becomes important which type of internet-valuing consumers are purchasing 
broadband connections.  The ‘bundled connection’ effect gifts connections to all telephony 
users regardless of their valuation of internet usage.  They will consume dial-up to the point 
where the extra marginal price paid exceeds the benefit received.  Where usage is priced at 
zero, anyone with a positive internet usage valuation will consume, even though they would 
not have used the internet at all had they faced average cost prices.  Substantial internet usage 
is being consumed by individuals who may value it very lowly (i.e. their demand is very 
elastic). However, when substituting to broadband, they face a price for both internet 
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connection and usage (either separately or bundled into a fixed rate plan).  Only those for 
whom the benefit exceeds the combined connection and usage cost will substitute.  Those 
with a high valuation of time, or other reasons for highly valuing use of the internet, will 
substitute at low usage volumes, even though they do not use a large amount of bandwidth.  
For individuals of equal usage valuation, the higher the per-minute charge, the more will 
substitute to broadband.  By extension, the lower the per-minute charge for dial-up, the higher 
becomes the marginal valuation of internet usage at which an internet user will substitute.   
 
Once again, as with the connection case, at the extreme, where dial-up usage is fully 
subsidised from connections, the marginal valuation of internet use at which substitution takes 
place will be greatest.  Relative to the hypothetical case of efficient telephony tariffs, 
substitution is delayed (occurs at a higher valuation of internet usage) when telephony 
connection subsidises usage, and occurs earlier (i.e. at a lower valuation of internet usage) 
when telephony usage subsidises connection.  
 
3.3.5 Application to the New Zealand Data 
It can now be seen that flat rate telephony tariffs have had a two-part effect upon the time at 
which substitution to broadband occurs.  It is not at all surprising that, after accounting for all 
other apparent influencing factors, New Zealand’s broadband uptake has been sluggish 
compared to other OECD countries.    The most significant difference which explains the 
New Zealand pattern is the tariff structure of the legacy technology.  New Zealand has been 
‘doubly disadvantaged’ by both the ‘bundled connection’ and ‘tied usage’ effects of the free 
local calling traffic relative to all countries charging two-part tariffs.  Importantly, the 
marginal valuation of both internet connection and internet usage at which substitution to 
broadband occurs will be lower in countries where two-part telephony tariffs prevail than in 
countries with flat-rate charges21.   
 
An interesting by-product of the tariff analysis is the apparently very high levels of dial-up 
usage at which substitution appears to have been occurring.  Until 2004, despite the 
multiplicitous supply-side advantages and the prevalence of two-part broadband tariffs in 
New Zealand, very little substitution had occurred.  This suggests that, even though internet 
usage was extensive (averaging around 35 hours per month), that usage was not very highly 
valued (i.e. demand for the connection and usage bundle was comparatively elastic).  As 
prices did not change substantially in 2004, it appears as though the main driver of the 
                                                     
21 By this reasoning, Australia’s slightly higher broadband uptake than New Zealand’s, despite higher broadband prices, is likely 
a consequence of the fact that whilst fixed line calls are unmetered, in Australia there is a charge levied for each call made.    
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increased rate of substitution pertained to a fundamental change in individuals’ valuation of 
the internet, from equation (1) likely through either the use of new applications, or increased 
use of existing applications.   
 
3.3.6 The Link Between Applications, User Valuation and Substitution Timing 
A key to explaining the New Zealand pattern lies in the emergence internationally of peer-to-
peer applications such as YouTube and Facebook over this period, and, apparently quite 
material nationally, the increasing use of the most popular New Zealand-based web 
application, the consumer-to-consumer trading platform TradeMe.  TradeMe pages contain a 
lot of rich graphic material (e.g. photographs of items for sale), and although constraints are 
placed upon the size of pictures posted in order to make it feasible for members to engage in a 
meaningful interaction on dial-up connections, for frequent traders loading auction data and 
individuals browsing many auctions, broadband speeds offer a very much more efficient 
participation.  
 
Figure 6 shows the growth of TradeMe membership, auction numbers and unique visitor 
addresses (i.e. the unique computer identifications from which members access the exchange) 
from 2001 to 2008.  TradeMe’s growth is strongly correlated with growth in the number of 
broadband connections sold (and therefore the rate of substitution from dial-up to broadband).   
In 2003, it had fewer than 150,000 members – about 0.18 per active internet account.  In 
February 2008 if had nearly 2 million members (2 per active internet account), and page 
views averaged one billion per month – an average of 520 per member per month and around 
a thousand for each of New Zealand’s active internet accounts.   
 
The emergence and growth of TradeMe thus appears to offer the best local demand-side 
explanation for the timing of New Zealand’s change in substitution pattern – the emergence 
of a new and highly-valued application increased both the volume of internet usage and the 
value accrued by individuals from that usage.  Its effect in altering the value placed upon 
internet usage by New Zealanders has (by the theories in this paper) been sufficient to counter 
the strong brakes put on substitution away from dial-up by the ‘connection bundling’ and 
‘tied usage’ effects of ‘free local calling’ under the ‘Kiwi Share’.   Rather than supply-side 
regulation and competition influencing price and offering differentiation, it has most probably 
been demand-side valuation of internet use due to the arrival of a new application that led to 
the ‘tipping point’ in 2003 graphically illustrated in Figure 1.   
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4. Lessons from New Zealand 
The primary lesson for the rest of the OECD from the New Zealand experience is that the 
extensive use of flat-rate tariffs for a legacy technology, whilst undoubtedly increasing the 
use of that technology, poses substantial impediments to substitution to a frontier technology, 
due to the ‘tied usage’ effect, which raises the marginal valuation of usage at which a user 
will move to the new technology.  If connection to the legacy technology has also been 
subsidised by bundling it in with another product which is highly-valued by the user, then this 
too will delay the point at which substitution occurs by also raising the marginal valuation at 
which a user will substitute.  The ‘bundled connection’ effect applies to all tariff structures, 
but is greatest in the case of flat-rate pricing of the legacy.    
 
The current popularity of flat-rate tariffs for broadband access, and extensive use of ‘triple 
play’ bundling of telephone, video and internet access may thus have significant effects upon 
the ability to induce substitution to new frontier internet access technologies (e.g. fibre to the 
home) relative to the case of ‘efficient’ pricing where connection is charged to recover fixed 
costs and usage is priced at marginal cost.   Whilst high-valuing users will substitute early, 
many high-volume users of the legacy technology may not substitute rapidly, as they do not 
necessarily value either their connection or their usage highly (e.g. the technology in question 
is the least-valued item in the bundle), as their usage has not been constrained by any 
meaningful usage pricing.   The New Zealand experience suggests that the substitution inertia 
created by the flat-rate tariff may only be overcome by the development of new applications 
which are both highly-valued by the majority of users and which can only be feasibly 
deployed on the frontier.  If satisfactory user experiences can be obtained on the legacy 
technology, bundling and flat-rate tariffs pose substantial barriers to substitution.  
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Figure 1 
NZ Internet Market 2000-2006
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Source data: Statistics New Zealand ISP Surveys and Telecom Management Commentaries 
 
 
Figure 2.  New Zealand Telephone Traffic 1996-2003 
Source: Howell & Obren (2003:33) 
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Figure 3 
New Zealand ADSL Market 2003-2007
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Figure 4 
Correlatation: NZ DSL and Dial-Up 
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Figure 5 
Correlation: Dial-up Accounts and Usage
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Figure 6 
 
Source: Dominion Post March 12 2008 p A7;  http://www.stuff.co.nz/4435153a6479.html  
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